New evidence confirms what gun rights advocates have said for a long time about crime:

In the study, led by epidemiologist Anthony Fabio of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public Health, researchers partnered with the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police to trace the origins of all 893 firearms that police recovered from crime scenes in the year 2008.

They found that in approximately 8 out of 10 cases, the perpetrator was not a lawful gun owner but rather in illegal possession of a weapon that belonged to someone else. The researchers were primarily interested in how these guns made their way from a legal purchase — at a firearm dealer or via a private sale — to the scene of the crime.

…

More than 30 percent of the guns that ended up at crime scenes had been stolen, according to Fabio’s research.

We have a complete and nationwide ban on most recreational drugs. Yet, the average high school dropout can get whatever recreational drug they want 24×7 365 days a year. What sort of law do they imagine will prevent criminals from getting whatever gun they want?

If someone is of such poor character that they can’t be trusted to possess a gun then they can’t be trusted to be unsupervised in public.

Dave Hardy contributed to an Amicus brief in NYSRPA v. NYC. In it they give us a history lesson in how rational basis, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny of the constitutionality of laws came about. I found it fascinating.

This is the core of the lesson:

The use of multiple standards of review to evaluate the same statute is an import from First Amendment challenges to election laws, specifically ballot-access laws. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Timmons v. Twin Cities New Party, 520 U.S. 351 358 (1997); Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279, 288-89 (1992).

It is important to note that these election law cases address an unusual, indeed unique, constitutional problem.

On the one hand, elections involve the very core of First Amendment rights. “Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S, 1, 17 (1964). “[V]oting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979). Thus, the ordinary application of the First Amendment would use strict scrutiny to evaluate virtually all regulation of elections.

On the other hand, extensive government regulation is necessary merely to make elections possible, let alone fair. “[A]s a practical matter, there must be substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). “To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex elections codes,” each part of which “inevitably affects – at least to some degree – the individual’s right to vote….” Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).

It is hard to envision another First Amendment right that can only be exercised on a day and at a place dictated by the government, with expression restricted to making government-designated choices by checking boxes on a government-provided form.

They go on to explain that because the exercise of the right to keep and bear arms does not depend upon the existence of government regulation to be exercised in a meaningful way firearms laws should be reviewed using the “strict scrutiny” standard:

The dual standard of review used by the Second Circuit, and other courts, is thus taken from the unique setting of ballot-access laws. It is inappropriately
applied to the Second Amendment, a setting where the considerations that underlie ballot access regulations are inapplicable.

And in conclusion urges SCOTUS:

This Court should reverse the ruling below, reject its use of a dual standard of review.

My translation:

Shall. Not. Be. Infringed.