Like that is going to help

It’s a pleasant fantasy but the people offering these sort of solutions either don’t understand the problem or don’t want to face reality. From one of our wonderful government laboratories:

Los Alamos Lab developing liquid scanner for airport security

Scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing a new type of scanner that can distinguish liquids blaring out a warning for bad ones, like explosives, while letting through good ones, like water.

They will be able to scan bottles as big as a “magnum-sized champaign bottle,” Espy said.

“Apparently the whole duty-free thing is suffering, and people can’t carry their liquor on airplanes anymore,” Espy said. “It’s been disruptive to commerce. So, that’s one of the benefits of this.”

Software upgrades could add new liquids to the device’s detection list if any new threats arise, she said.

“The nice thing about this system is it’s not tuned to any specific threats,” Espy said. “As new materials of concern arise, it can be adapted to detect those.”

Even after the scanner is in place we still won’t be able to take liquor on airplanes–unless they are going to allow ethanol on board. In which case I need to demonstrate how to make an “explosive” out of ethanol. It would be tough to get a true detonation but in the enclosed space of an airplane cabin it just won’t matter whether the speed of propagation is greater than or less than the speed of sound.

And if they stop letting people take liquid hydrocarbons on board I’ll demonstrate the same sort of thing is possible with bread flour, powdered sugar, or coffee creamer. And when they ban those let them build a scanner that is sensitive to powdered human hair.

And those ideas are all taking the direct “brute force” approach. There are lots of other, much more subtle, ways to defeat airport “security”. TSA is backward for A Security Theater. It’s time we considered the alternatives.

The test was too hard

If some terrorist gets a bomb through security TSA (A Security Theater) is apparently going to tell them try again because they missed it the first time or three. But since it’s coming from that liberal haven (read “logic impaired”) of San Francisco it all sort of makes sense:

USA Today revealed that a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) report found screeners at SFO failed to find small bomb parts 20 percent of the time during a recent 12-month test.

SFO spokesperson, Mike McCarron, said the failure rate is unacceptable.

But McCarron said the TSA may have simply made the test too hard.

See also these news items on airport security:

This last item is of particular interest because the TSA is telling everyone, “Hide your stuff here, we won’t look there.”

I’ve been harping on this for a long time and I don’t see any evidence to invalidate my conclusions. It’s time to consider alternatives to TSA because what we have now is just Security Theater.

They just don’t get it

I suppose its to be expected. You can’t get more government contracts if you were to tell them the problem cannot be solved as long as they are headed in that direction. But what you can do is sell them millions and millions of dollars of technology that can be defeated with a few dollars worth of mu-metal and/or a Faraday Shield. I guess it doesn’t matter. It’s just government money. They have to spend it on something anyway, right?

Here are the details:

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has a comforting prospect for the million or so daily passengers on U.S. airlines. Los Alamos National Laboratory is working on an alternative to the “sandwich bag” solution for carry-on liquids.

Passengers’ ability to carry liquids with them during boarding has improved since the original total ban installed after a plot involving liquid explosives on transatlantic flights was busted in London in August 2006.

A total ban has given way to a partial ban because current X-ray machines can detect liquids, but they don’t know the difference between Gatorade and a liquid explosive.

But the so-called “3-1-1” plan for placing smaller-than-3-ounce liquid containers into one separately scanned, quart-size plastic bag per passenger remains an annoyance for many airport travelers, a fact that has not been lost on the department.

Within a month after the London scheme was foiled, said Michelle Espy, LANL’s co-principal investigator on the project, the laboratory had sketched out a “proof of concept” for a liquid-sensing instrument that has come to be called SENSIT.

In May this year, Brian Tait, a program manager in the Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency made a presentation on LANL’s demonstration for using magnetic resonance technology to perform non-invasive “liquid and solid explosive detection at ultra-low field without radiation.”

Espy said the technology is a variation on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), a very low-field approach that the lab has been using for studying the brain in a technique known as magneto-encephalography, which is a way of reading signals emanating from the brain.

The sensor or magnetometer used in both the brain study and the bottle analyzer is known as a SQUID, an acronym that stands for Superconducting Quantum Interfering Device.

Comforting? I suppose you could say that. It will give some people a false sense of comfort. But then that’s what TSA is all about anyway. A Security Theater that makes some people feel good.

Another example of TSA’s uselessness

Box Cutter Sails Through Airport Security

At least TSA put on a little bit of a show for their Security Theater. They make him pour out his coffee.

Unobscuring Kip Hawley

TSA head Kip Hawley (http://www.kiphawleyisanidiot.com/) attempts to explain the reason for the three ounce limit on liquids and why the rule is reasonable. He is deliberately obscure in places:

“This is something we thought a lot about. There’s a whole classified section to the answer, but in the unclassified part we are limited to discussing, with 3-1-1, the major focus was first, to stop assembled bombs,” he said.

“The nature of liquid explosives is that they are very volatile, unlike military-grade explosives that react predictably. With homemade explosives, while the benefit is that they are made of easy-to-get ingredients, the downside is that you get widely different results for the same quote-unquote recipe.

“If you’re going to use these explosives in the aviation context, you have to be very precise in the mixing because, as we found in the testing, minor variations in formula have a very dramatic effect on whether or not the explosives are successful.

“So 3-1-1- eliminates the ability to assemble the ingredients in a laboratory, using expert people to provide a finished bomb for somebody to use on a suicide mission on an airplane,” he said.

On a plane, mixing up a bomb in a suitable container “isn’t like mixing a beverage,” he said, adding: “This stuff is very volatile; it is very obvious; you can smell it a long way away. It’s very corrosive.”

The volatile stuff he’s talking about would be the acetone used to make acetone peroxide. And yes acetone is very smelly. I have never made acetone peroxide and have no plans to. It’s called “Mother of Satan” for a reason.

The “very corrosive” stuff would be nitric and sulfuric acids used to make nitroglycerin; probably the most well known of all liquid explosives.

Yup. Mixing up either of those explosives without being noticed would be difficult on a plane. The acetone in particular is very noticeable. Finger polish remover is frequently acetone. So if someone starts working on removing their fingernail polish don’t be surprised if you see the flight crew getting a little excited about finding the source of the smell.

The problem with the whole explosives testing thing is that there are lots of things made out of stuff they don’t, and essentially can’t, test for that make the whole exercise just A Security Theater. That money would be far better spent on finding the bad guys before they ever got to the airport. But don’t expect Hawley to tell you that. It’s not his job to tell you his job is a sham. His job is to make you feel safer. Do you feel safe yet?

Doublespeak from an airport police chief

First a refresher course.

I don’t know if he actually believes this or not. Maybe he does and just doesn’t have a good imagination. Or maybe it’s just that it’s part of his job to comfort the sheepeople even if he knows he isn’t telling them the complete truth:

Chief Troyer has been a driving force behind all of the airport security changes that has especially been focusing on removing items from people’s luggage that could be used to make explosives.

But we get this doublespeak and I just get annoyed with him:

“I don’t necessarily see it as being stricter as it is begin responsive to the threat,” Spokane International Airport Police Chief Pete Troyer said.

Whatever. The guy is just an actor in a security theater. What can you expect from someone like that? He reads his lines and he entertains the public.

TSA fodder

You can make a crude stun gun from a disposable camera. A better quality flash unit will have a faster recycle time.

There is no limit the number and type of weapons that can be easily made and gotten past the Theater Security Agents (TSA). I’ve already mentioned making dust explosions with flour (powdered coffee creamer works too). It’s long past time to consider some alternatives to existing airplane security.

Posts that get attention

Interesting. My most recent post about the TSA is getting more and more attention. Most recent is this mention in a forum:

If you really need to believe that you’re safe when you get on a plane, don’t read the above. If you want to realize what a bullshit fantasy “safety” through a “security” agency is, then take the red pill and click the link.

I like how he expressed that. Very nice. I remember one time not too long after 9/11 Ry was having Thanksgiving dinner with us and our extended family at my parent’s place. Somehow Ry (software tester extraordinaire–finding flaws is what software testers do) and I started talking about all the vulnerabilities in our country that someone could use to cause us great damage. We were rattling things off so fast that someone had to raise their voice to get in a command to “STOP”. People didn’t want to know. They wanted ignorance. This is baffling to me, but whatever.

Anyway, on to what makes particular posts interesting…

Uncle and Existing Thing (via Uncle) linked to my TSA post. I was thinking Uncle would link to it when I made it. He links to almost anything of mine that is a little out of the ordinary (honest, I have only made him one offer for a free position at Boomershoot–which he hasn’t acted upon. I don’t think that constitutes bribery). Thinking about what makes a post interesting I made the connection to the recent career advice from Scott Adams (via Kim). I have expertise in more than one field and combining that expertise with a somewhat rare political viewpoint (pro-freedom) increases my “value”. In this case it was my expertise in explosives and (computer) security.

I keep wondering if there is a way to combine all my hobbies in an interesting way. But at least for me guns, explosives, and sex just don’t mix.

What TSA really stands for

It is late at night and I got a little agitated reading some of the comments at Schneier’s blog post about airplane security. When I’m tired my inhibtions drop and I write things I might not normally. Here’s a duplicate of the rant I left in Schneier’s comments:

Regarding dust explosions…

This is about 8 ounces of flour over an ounce of black powder (the original gun powder): https://www.joehuffman.org/FlashTek/06-FFFFgFlour.mpeg

That is in open air. In an enclosed room of an abandoned house a similar test brought the house down. Sorry, that wasn’t my test and I don’t have any video for it.

Shaped charges made from match heads? I don’t think so. The “detonation” velocity is just too slow. It’s more properly called deflagration than detonation for that type of “explosive”. Shaped charges require MUCH faster propagation rates.

Binary explosives are available here: http://www.tannerite.com/ No background check, no license required, delivered to your door via UPS. Now THAT is something you can make a crude shaped charge with.

The “projectile” (typically a slug of molten copper) from a shaped charge is moving at 6 to 10 kilometers per second. At the pressures generated when it hits a “target” everything is “plastic”. Hardened steel develops a hole just like a high velocity stream from your garden hose nozzle punches a hole in a dirt bank. Penetration for a properly configured 10 (ten) gram shaped charges is about 2 inches of steel. Yes–a shaped charge using less than one half ounce of explosives will penetrate two inches of steel. See Explosives Engineering by Paul W. Cooper, ISBN 0-471-18636-8 page 442. Or do you think the doors to the cockpit are more resistant than two inches of steel?

Do you think someone could not get a half ounce of explosives through TSA security? You could probably successfully hide that in your mouth or arm pit if you didn’t want to use some other body cavity.

Oh, and you know why the explosives detectors work fairly well with plastic explosives? It’s, by international agreement (Montreal, March 1, 1991, Article XIII of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives — http://www.atf.gov/explarson/fedexplolaw/subpartj.pdf ), that all plastic explosives be “marked” by their manufacture with a chemical that is easily detected. Do you think Iran and others are going to abide by that International Convention if they want to provide some terrorists plastic explosives?

We really should spend the $2 billion/year, or whatever it is, on finding and stopping the bad guys before they arrive at the airport/train-station/shopping-mall/etc. than on pointless screening. The bottom line is that the acronym TSA should be reversed–it really stands for “A Security Theater”.

Quote of the day–Kip Hawley

Screening ideas are indeed thought up by the Office for Annoying Air Travelers and vetted through the Directorate for Confusion and Complexity, and then we review them to insure that there are sufficient unintended irritating consequences so that the blogosphere is constantly fueled.

Kip Hawley
Head of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
April/May of 2007 via an email interview with Bruce Schneier
[Yes, he said that. It was sarcasm. Not that I don’t think there was a certain amount of truth in it as well. Reading the rest of the interview (part of one of five is all that is out) was interesting. As you might expect Schneier is asking the right questions but, at least so far, Hawley is avoiding some of the questions and Schneier isn’t following up as well as I think he should. For example, Hawley gives a feels good answer to claims of 90% failure on weapons detection. But I don’t think there have been any changes that can defeat certain, extremely simple, scenarios.

You are requested to lay your carry-on luggage “flat” on the belt for a reason. That reason is the X-Ray image is produced in the vertical direction. Laying the luggage flat gives the screener the least clutter in the image. It also means that you can present the screener with the most favorable profile of your weapon. Imagine what the profile of a knife looks like on edge and what acceptable carry-on items might look similar or camouflage the knife on edge. It is my contention that short of hand searching or complete emptying of luggage at the check points it will be trivial to get knives past security in your carry-on luggage. Firearms are only slightly more difficult. There may be some things they can do to detect ammunition via nuclear methods but I suspect even that can be defeated if you know what you are doing. It is my contention we would all be much better off if we explored different methods of security.–Joe]

Airport security–including FOUO material

Someone released a For Official Use Only (FOUO) document from the TSA and MSNBC posted it online. The basics are:

A surge in recent suspicious incidents at U.S. airports may indicate terrorists are conducting pre-attack security probes and “dry runs” similar to dress rehearsals. Past terrorist attacks and plots show that such testing generally indicates attacks will soon follow, according to a joint FBI and Homeland Security assessment.

It’s mildly interesting in that it seems to confirm people are probing our airport security system. My view is that airport security as it’s currently implemented is a lost cause (see also this posting from David Mackett, the president of the Airline Pilots Security Alliance). Those resources would be far better spent on finding the bad guys before they ever arrive at the airport and implementing something else for on board security.

Update: Via Bruce–at least one of the reports was bogus:

The TSA bulletin said the ice packs were covered in duct tape and had clay inside of them.

Sanfilippo said they weren’t covered in duct tape and didn’t have clay inside of them. “It is a little bit off,” he said of the bulletin.

The chief said a Harbor Police officer found what appeared to be hardened old gel that had seeped out of the ice packs and dried, leaving a clay-like substance around the outside edge of the pack.

I wonder if it was incompetence or if the TSA was trying to justify their existence. Both are plausible.

Photo ID not needed to fly

Airport “security” is all “security theater”. It is all for show and doesn’t really make us any safer. But it does make some people feel better. They really should investigate some alternatives but the sheeple would whimper and cry for mommy to protect them or something. And so as part of this show they made a big deal of requiring government issued photo ID before you could fly on a commerical flight. As if that made a difference somehow. Well… they’ve quietly backed off on that requirement:

Turns out there is no requirement that you produce a photo ID when you travel on a commercial airplane.

Originally, the TSA’s Web site stated, “You must present a Boarding Pass and a Photo ID to get to the checkpoint and to your gate.”

The latest TSA Web site language, however, states: “We encourage each adult traveler to keep his/her airline boarding pass and government-issued photo ID available until exiting the security checkpoint [children are not required to show identification]. The absence of proper identification will result in additional screening.”

The TSA spokeswoman confirms: “If a passenger doesn’t have one, like yourself, because it was lost, which does happen, then we do subject them to additional screening.”