Prosecutions are not in view, but I can see a map on a whiteboard in the Department of Justice on how to get there from here. I asked Grok and Copilot to speculate on the possibility of prosecutions under 18 USC 241 and/or 242. Here are the more interesting parts of the discussions:

Copilot:

Historical Use of 18 U.S.C. § 241

• Conspiracy statute: § 241 criminalizes conspiracies to deprive rights. It was first enacted in 1870 to combat KKK terror against Black voters.
• Election interference: Recently, it was used in prosecutions for conspiracies to suppress voting rights, including charges against Douglass Mackey (for online voter suppression) and in investigations tied to January 6.
• Scope: It applies broadly to conspiracies against any constitutional right, but prosecutions are rare and usually tied to voting or racial discrimination.

🔍 Implications for Second Amendment Enforcement

• § 242 (individual acts): Could apply if police knowingly confiscate firearms without due process or target lawful gun owners. This parallels past prosecutions for unlawful arrests or excessive force.
• § 241 (conspiracies): Could apply if officials or agencies coordinate to suppress gun rights — for example, a conspiracy to intimidate citizens from exercising lawful firearm ownership.
• Politicians: Legislative immunity makes prosecutions of lawmakers unlikely. Enforcement would more plausibly target executive officials or law enforcement carrying out unconstitutional policies.
• Civil vs. criminal: Historically, DOJ has leaned on civil remedies (consent decrees, lawsuits) rather than criminal prosecutions. Criminal cases under §§ 241–242 are reserved for egregious, intentional violations.

📈 Speculative Outlook

• Most likely: Expanded civil rights litigation against restrictive gun laws.
• Possible but rare: Criminal prosecutions of law enforcement under § 242 for willful firearm rights violations.
• Least likely: Criminal prosecutions of politicians under § 241, given constitutional protections and prosecutorial discretion.

Grok:

Pathways to the Docket: From Desk Jockeys to Brass

Picture this: The unit’s hotline lights up with complaints about a county clerk in, say, Chicago—deliberately burying CCW apps under mountains of “training requirements” invented post-Bruen, knowing full well the Supreme Court nixed such hurdles. If emails or depositions reveal the clerk’s motive (“Keep guns out of the wrong hands,” per internal notes), that’s prima facie willfulness: a solo deprivation under color of law. The LA County probe, already underway for backlog abuses, could morph into a § 242 referral if it uncovers a rogue supervisor greenlighting the delays.

For politicians, it’s thornier but not off the table. A mayor enforcing a local “sensitive places” ban broader than Bruen allows—say, prohibiting carry in all parks, willfully ignoring federal precedent—might qualify if they personally direct enforcement squads to harass permit holders. Legislators enjoy speech-or-debate immunity, but executive-branch pols (governors signing defiance-laden bills) could face heat if their actions cross into implementation. Gun rights litigators have floated § 242 for years in amicus briefs, arguing that unconstitutional seizures equate to Fourth Amendment deprivations intertwined with 2A. With Dhillon’s vow for “a lot more action,” a test case could drop by mid-2026, especially if the Firearms Policy Coalition (which lobbied for the unit) supplies the plaintiffs.

Tying it to § 241? These aren’t mutually exclusive: A sheriff conspiring with deputies (§ 241) while personally pulling triggers on denials (§ 242) could net dual charges, amplifying deterrence.

Hurdles Higher Than a Pistol Grip: Willfulness and Wiggle Room

§ 242’s killer requirement—willful intent—makes it a prosecutor’s nightmare. Courts demand more than negligence; officials must know their act violates a “clearly established” right. Post-Bruen, that’s arguable for “may-issue” holdouts, but gray-area regs (e.g., “assault weapon” definitions) give cover: “I thought it was legal!” The statute’s underuse in non-violence cases—fewer than 200 § 242 indictments yearly, mostly brutality—suggests prosecutors shy from 2A novelty.

Politically, it’s dynamite: Indicting blue-city cops under a red-led DOJ screams partisanship, inviting congressional probes or SCOTUS stays. And while the unit reallocates civil resources, criminal pursuits demand FBI muscle—scarce amid other priorities.

The Bigger Picture: A One-Two Punch for Accountability?

Layering § 242 atop § 241 could transform the unit from litigator to inquisitor, making gun rights a frontline civil rights battle. Near-term? Civil suits dominate, with § 242 as a shadow threat to coax settlements. But if a high-profile denial spirals into violence—say, a denied applicant victimized, traceable to official stonewalling—expect indictments by 2027. It’s a vision of equity: Treating 2A infringements like any other rights grab, potentially chilling overreach without mass arrests.

The emphasis in that last paragraph is my addition.

Indictments by 2027 is a pleasant thought. But that expectation is conditional upon the criminals being stupid as well as evil. We can only hope.