Theater Security Theater*

Elaboration on the following Tweet from Saturday night:

Ticket taker for Dark Knight checked my companion’s bag for a gun. She didn’t notice the STI Eagle on my right hip or the mag on the left.

The ticket taker asked to check my companion’s bag and said, “We are doing this since the shooting in Colorado.” The ticket taker glanced inside the bag and said, “Okay” as my companion and I glanced at each other in shock. We took a few steps down the hall toward the theater and burst out laughing. Through my shirt my companion patted my right then left hip and laughed even louder.

It was an STI Eagle 5.1 chambered in .40 S&W. I was carrying a total of two 18 round magazines plus one in the chamber for a total of 37 rounds. I could have been carrying a dozen magazines in my pockets and socks and the ticket taker wouldn’t have noticed. It was nothing but security theater.

I was tempted to tell the poor young woman that if she asked to inspect the bag of someone intent on an Aurora type shooting that she was going to be first to get shot. But I didn’t see the point in making her more unhappy with her job than she already was. After all, who could like a job where people laugh at you behind your back?

The Tweet above was sent while waiting for the movie to start and was retweeted by nine people and made a favorite by two others. This makes it the most popular, by far, tweet of mine.


*Title as per the suggestion from Bitter. I considered “Security Theater in the Theater” but the shorter version creates some addition stress from the ambiguity which I kind of like.

Magazine limits are security theater

I hadn’t thought of it this way before (even though he used my video to demonstrate his point) but he’s correct.

Why Magazine Limits Don’t Improve Security:

This video demonstrates what a practiced shooter can do with lower capacity magazines in short order. It should be quite clear that a high magazine capacity ban will do nothing to prevent a shooter of this skill level from wreaking significant havoc. Therefore, a high capacity magazine ban is nothing short of false sense of security– security theater.

A step in the right direction

Via Politico I found out Rand Paul has introduced legislation which from a principled viewpoint I find pathetic. Only if I put my Wookie suit in a hidden vault and delete thousands of blog posts could I praise his first piece of proposed legislation. It is “a ‘Bill of Rights’ for air travelers” (S. 3302). “Guaranteeing a traveler’s right to request a pat-down using only the back of the hand” is to be considered a “right’? Really?


We don’t need a new law like this, we just need to enforce those already on the books. I’m of the opinion the 4th Amendment is the guaranteed right. All who voted for or have been involved in the implementation of TSA should be prosecuted under 18 USC 241 and/or 18 USC 242. Impose fines for every violation and you would see second thought given to a lot of other government infringements of our rights as well as A Security Theater going down in flames.


The other Bill, S. 3303, “ends the TSA screening program and requires screening of passengers at airports to be conducted by private screeners only”. While elimination of the TSA would earn my praise the requirement that private business violate our 4th Amendment rights nearly nullifies the benefit.


But, as I said, that is from a principled viewpoint. Principles are a serious obstacle in politics. If you want to get anything done you had best leave your principles at the door and just keep a short cheat sheet up your coat sleeve when you enter the legislative arena. If either of these bills could be passed it would be a step in the right direction. Incrementalism is sometimes all that is politically feasible and that we have legislators looking for a path in the proper direction is something to be pleased with.

Quote of the day—Jesse Ventura

People in this country need to understand when you go to any airport in the United States, you are not protected by the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. They can do anything they want to you and there is no where you can go to seek redress.

Jesse Ventura
June 13, 2012
Jesse Ventura No Longer Flies, Thanks To Transportation Security Administration
[Well… strictly speaking there are some options. They just aren’t legal.

What really needs to be done is to abolish the Security Theater known as TSA.—Joe]

Random thought of the day

If having your cell phone or other electronic device turned on could jeopardize the safety of an airplane then why allow electronic devices on the plane at all? Why couldn’t a group of suicide terrorists carry high powered electronic devices on airplanes and turn them on during critical portions of the flight and bring them down at will? Or even aim a directional beam at planes from the ground and bring them down?


One has to conclude that the prohibition against having your cell phone turned on is just more security theater.


Update: Some awesome stuff in the comments. I think I need to back down some on my claims above…

Security theater on the Internet

Via Say Uncle we get this annoying news:

The FBI is asking Internet companies not to oppose a controversial proposal that would require firms, including Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, and Google, to build in backdoors for government surveillance.
 
In meetings with industry representatives, the White House, and U.S. senators, senior FBI officials argue the dramatic shift in communication from the telephone system to the Internet has made it far more difficult for agents to wiretap Americans suspected of illegal activities, CNET has learned.
 
The FBI general counsel’s office has drafted a proposed law that the bureau claims is the best solution: requiring that social-networking Web sites and providers of VoIP, instant messaging, and Web e-mail alter their code to ensure their products are wiretap-friendly.
 
“If you create a service, product, or app that allows a user to communicate, you get the privilege of adding that extra coding,” an industry representative who has reviewed the FBI’s draft legislation told CNET. The requirements apply only if a threshold of a certain number of users is exceeded, according to a second industry representative briefed on it.

This is so crap for brains stupid I am surprised the author of the article and the industry representatives didn’t fall over laughing at the FBI. Since the “requirements apply only if a threshold of a certain number of users is exceeded” as long as the number is greater than two they can’t enforce such a requirement against small groups of people. And that assumes the criminals were to use service providers in the U.S. that are easy to track down. With overseas and even open Wi-Fi access points so easy to access even finding a group of a criminals who utilized an illegal communication system would be tough.

This is nothing but A Security Theater that invades the privacy of those that pose no threat to the general population and can be used as a tool by unscrupulous politicians and government thugs to embarrass or blackmail their opponents.

Why TSA explosives detection is pointless

If the TSA were to scan for Ammonium Nitrate fertilizer (AN) they would get a very high percentage of travelers testing positive as this guy did:

An 82-year-old farmer from Brush got quite the surprise Thursday when he was briefly detained by Fort Collins-Loveland airport security after his suitcase tested positive for the chemicals used to make bombs.

Large numbers of false positives mean they have to hand examine large numbers of people. This will require far more manpower and increase the frustration with the TSA. If they don’t scan for AN then they leave a huge gaping hole in their security. Yes, AN needs something else with it to detonate. Boomerite, for example, uses Potassium Chlorate (PC) and Ethylene Glycol (EG). Scanning for either of these isn’t going to accomplish anything. PC is one of the main ingredients in matches. EG is the common automobile anti-freeze. False positives are us.

Scanning for all three, AN, PC, and EG would detect Boomerite but there isn’t anything particularly magic about those three. AN with any number of things will explode. Here is just a partial list of things I have used:

  • Aluminum powder
  • Diesel
  • Model racing fuel
  • Powdered milk
  • Powdered sugar
  • Wheat flour
  • Propylene Glycol
  • Nitromethane
  • Acetone (nail polish remover)
  • Methanol (wood alcohol)
  • Naphthalene (moth balls)

Basically anything that will burn will enable detonation of AN. So unless TSA is willing to detain and hand search every passenger that walked through their recently fertilized lawn and then ate a powdered sugar donut on the way to security there is no point in scanning for AN. Plus this assumes that a real threat would not be able to seal and clean up their explosives device and themselves sufficiently that they couldn’t get their chemical profile below the detection threshold.

Since explosives detection is pointless and they do not hand examine every passenger TSA is really nothing but A Security Theater.

Quote of the day—Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.)

The growth of TSA’s bureaucracy has outpaced the number of travelers the agency was designed to protect.

Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.)
March 28, 2012
How many airport security screeners is too many?
[I went through the Moscow/Pullman airport a few weeks ago and counted six TSA agents. There could have been more in back out of sight. 15 years ago, with only slightly less of passenger traffic, there was one security agent.

There are some things government is really good at—spending lots of other people’s money is near the top of that list.

If you have a desire to waste huge amounts of money then giving it to the government is probably a near optimal method of having your desires realized. If you merely burn your money and don’t get it completely burned someone could come along and recover a portion of it. Money given to the government is much less likely to incur those sort of risks.—Joe]

Quote of the day—Steve Moore

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was formed to ensure America’s freedom to travel. Instead, they have made air travel the most difficult means of mass transit in the United States, at the same time failing to make air travel any more secure.

TSA is finally feeling what it’s like to be screened. It has walked through the detector of bureaucratic failure and the red light has gone off. It’s time that we ask congress to have TSA “step over to this area” for a more thorough search. For once, “TSA screening” will be productive. I predict that dangerous amounts of inefficiency, derivative thinking, and reactive policy will be located, if not in their shoes, in their DNA.

Steve Moore
January 24, 2012
TSA: Fail
[I could probably pull a half dozen QOTDs from this post. It’s really good.

H/T Say Uncle and Richard R.—Joe]

Quote of the day—Colorado Passport Agency

We generally don’t consider a crease to be damaged or mutilated such that it would prevent travel. Even if the RFID chip in the passport fails to operate, as long as the data and photo are legible, there should be no problem.

Colorado Passport Agency
February 23, 2012
Denver family stranded after passport denied because of crease
[H/T Say Uncle.

So… what this appears to mean is that you may intentionally (perhaps with plausible deniability) destroy the RFID chip and not worry about it invalidating your passport. This eliminates all the concerns about remote RFID scanning. It also means our government knows and acknowledges the RFID chips do not enhance security. Any security arguments made about their use in passports is invalid by their own admission.

One must now ask, “What is the real reason why they want RFID chips in the passports?”—Joe]

Security theater must make people stupid

David Perera must have gone through the scanner a few too many times and his brain turned into crap. He claims that just because someone has a security clearance that doesn’t mean they should be allowed to go through airport security without being subjected to TSA scrutiny:

First, if the ability to go through the expedited line is given to all secret holders regardless of the purpose of their travel, clearance holders would be the recipient of an unfair perk relative to the rest of society. Clearance holders receive access to classified documents – not a badge that permits them to cut in line at the gas station, take 20 items through the 15-item supermarket checkout line or buy 3.2 beer in an Arkansas convenience store on a Sunday.

Just what does he think TSA security is for? It’s not a line at a gas station.

I kept expecting him to explain that the only purpose TSA serves is to harass and desensitize people to illegal searches. If some people don’t go through the desensitization process then TSA effectiveness is drastically reduced. After all, TSA has been insisting that pilots and the rest of the flight crew be searched so what purpose could that serve other than desensitization? Do they think that unless they search the pilot for box cutters he would be able to hijack the plane he was already flying?

But that doesn’t appear to be the case. As near as I can tell he really believes what he says. I can only conclude he has crap for brains. I expect that soon he will insist Air Marshals also go though TSA screening. After all their badges don’t enable them to take 20 items through the 15-item supermarket checkout line either.

Dusting it up with the TSA

For the near brain-dead supporters of the TSA that still exist out there I would like them to think about how the TSA could possibly stop a dust explosion such as this one on an airplane in flight. Compare the size and shape of the grain elevator in that picture to an airplane fuselage. Compare the strength of the materials (reinforced concrete versus a thin aluminum skin with window) used in the construction.

A few pounds of powdered sugar, flour, or powdered milk can make enough dust to take out a grain elevator and it is more than enough to take an airplane out of the sky. And just how is the TSA going to scan for that when everyone that has eaten a powdered sugared doughnut since they last changed their clothes is going to test positive?

The TSA is nothing but A Security Theater and only the most ignorant and stupid don’t know and understand that.

Hanging them with their own rope

A biometric login for your computer is useful and very cool. A biometric database of 9 million Jews with pictures, fingerprints, name, date of birth, national identification number, and family members is a target.

From 1933 through the early 1940’s IBM made a lot of money helping the Germans collect, sort, and distribute that sort of data.

That target was hit and is now available for free download.

Think about the implications before you advocate for a National ID card or the mandating of ID in order to be functioning member of society. Giving up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety has known consequences.

Update: Tamara knocks it out of the park.

Quote of the day—Bruce Schneier

Given the credible estimate that we’ve spent $1 trillion on anti-terrorism security (this does not include our many foreign wars), that’s $62.5 billion per life lost. Is there any other risk that we are even remotely as crazy about?

Bruce Schneier
September 15, 2011
Crypto-Gram Newsletter
[Some people are that crazy about guns. But for the most part I think Schneier has it nailed.—Joe]

Quote of the day—Barron Barnett

These piss swilling cheeba monkeys are TSA agents because of one of the following three conditions:

  1. They are too stupid to get a job any place else, including McDonald’s.
  2. They get off on physically molesting people .
  3. They are wanting crimes of opportunity for theft .

There are no other options.  While one would say maybe they just need a job, the bottom line is they sold their morals down the river and now are molesting people.  They are molesting people cause obviously they’re too stupid to get a job any place else.

Barron Barnett
September 8, 2011
A Security Theater and Illegal Aliens
[I think there is the possibility of some other reasons.

  • They could be of the opinion that it is the job of government to do these sort of things. The reasoning could be something like, “Government is for the good of the people. If the government does this then it must be good.”
  • They simplistically believe that laws against “molesting people” do not apply if they are wearing the proper badge (see examples where people have explicated claimed that possession of a badge means “the law doesn’t apply to us” here).

Still, Barron gets it almost completely right in the rest of his post which I categorize as “a nice rant”.—Joe]

It’s a start

I’ve often wondered if budget cuts would lead to less infringement upon our freedom. This is just a drop in the bucket and the effect will probably go completely unnoticed at our level. But it is a start:

The Transportation Security Administration is soon hoping to offer buyouts to about 3,000 administrative workers, one of dozens of federal agencies aiming to trim the payroll amid a budget crunch.

TSA is seeking authority from the Office of Personnel Management to offer buyouts to about 3,000 administrative and managerial workers based at its Northern Virginia headquarters and at regional offices nationwide, the agency said late Thursday.

Something that is more than a little telling about this organizations is the following from the same article:

The agency has offered voluntary early retirements to workers since December 2004 — about a year after the agency first opened.

It sounds to me like a major function of the agency is redistribution of wealth. When the budget crunch really hits I won’t have any probably advocating for the letting these guys and the politicians who enabled this sort of crap fend for themselves.

Security theater numbers

Why do they even try to fool us? The numbers are overwhelming in support of the claim that TSA stands for A Security Theater:

More than 10 percent of the TSA’s identification badges have errors that could compromise airport security, a new audit has found.

Omissions and inaccuracies ranging from birthdates and birthplaces to incorrect assessments of security threats abound in identification badges assigned to the approximately 900,000 people who have unescorted access to secure areas of airports, according to a report from the Department of Homeland Security inspector general.

Each year, the Transportation Security Authority oversees the vetting of approximately 550,000 badge applications.

There are nearly 1,000,000 people with unescorted access to secure areas of airports. Once inside the secure area they can travel to the secure area any other public airport in the country without having their credentials checked. Is anyone going to seriously try to convince me that not one in a million people is susceptible to black-mail, extortion, and/or threats against themselves or their family such that people will ill intent could not use them to gain access?

How much time can background investigators spend to vet those 550,000 applications? As the report says, they aren’t doing a very good job and it’s not surprising.

TSA—It is A Security Theater.

Random thought of the day

Barron suggests people show the TSA some verbal disrespect if you happen to meet them when they are not in a position of power over you.

I can’t find much fault with what he suggests. Perhaps it is just a waste of time. What I wonder is how much of this it would take before it would cause the turnover rate to noticeably increase. Beyond that how much would it take before the TSA would be shut down? And how many people would it take to accomplish this? This question can be generalized to other disliked organizations (not even restricted to governmental organizations).

If you say there are some organizations that can’t be eliminated this way then you don’t have enough imagination. Hypothetically the level of force can be scaled up to any level so in the extreme case this would be deadly force. And for small enough organizations, say a few dozen, one could imagine that a single “activist” could eliminate the entire organization and not get caught. Hence, in this extreme case one person could rid the planet of one hated organization by themselves.

At the other extreme you have one individual frowning at a single member of the hated organization composed of millions. The effect of which could not possibly be measured.

In between these two extremes there must be some level of force and number of applications of that force that results in the organization being disbanded. Could it be possible to determine what the minimum force and minimum required number of applications without going up against the TSA? Surely there is data that could be extrapolated from. If nothing else interviewing people that divorced their spouses or quit their jobs would provide some hints.

Suppose we had the numbers and we knew, for example, that the organization would disband if one of the following were true:

  • 50% of the organization were verbally abused every day for one month
  • 10% of the organization were physically assaulted at least once every month
  • 1% of the organization were murdered each month.

Now we look at the problem from a different perspective, the moral acceptability of the actions. Suppose the organization were the Police Battalions moving through Poland and the USSR in 1941-2. Morally any level of force would be justified because of the defensive of innocent life. On the other end the organization might be activists for a Pro-Choice/Life organization and even though they might stir up some strong emotions it would be difficult to justify using force beyond verbal abuse.

Now comes the tricky part. How do you measure the moral tradeoff in quantity versus level of force? That is, for the example at hand, suppose that you could end the TSA by slapping a single TSA agent. Probably one could justify that. It would be worth violation of moral principles because you stopped the violation of other principles by the TSA. Very much like using deadly force to defend innocent life from those that take it.

So is that how one should balance the moral scales? Force must be in proportion to that applied by the hated individual or organization? That works when the numbers are one on one. But what when the offenders number in the 10s of thousands and they offend hundreds of times per day and will repeatedly offend into the endless future? How are the scales of morality balanced now? What can be justified as the weight of those millions of offenses stretching on into eternity are balanced against a small number of greater offenses? Is one person suffering a vigorous slap the moral equivalent of 10 full body pat downs and five nude body scans of the innocent victims?

Closely related is another question. How many people would someone have to kill before a law were changed or broken law ignored? Imagine some criminal is holed up in a building, surrounded by the cops, and the negotiator tells him to surrender. The criminals says he wants to consider his options and asks, “How many people do I have to kill to be allowed to go free?” The negotiator says, “It doesn’t work that way. You will not be allowed to go free no matter how many people you kill.” The criminal says, “You lack imagination. Obviously if I kill everyone else on this continent I will go free. But I don’t want to do that. That would be too terrible and too difficult. But if it were somewhat fewer I might consider it. So I want to know what the number is.”

So what is the answer? If the “right people” people in the executive branch, down through the local police force, are killed that would probably do it too. That number might be relatively small. Perhaps a few hundred. It would be exceedingly immoral of course. But posing the question fascinates me because of the implications. It appears that if an extraordinary evil is perpetrated against, perhaps, some very small number of people then the entire fabric of our society could be changed.

9/11 was a crude example but that data point supports the hypothesis. The people who were murdered were, for all intents and purposes, chosen at random. And although it had profound changes on our society the response was different from that intended by the attackers. But what if the people attacked were individually chosen for their position of power and it was believed the attackers could do it again at will and probably never get caught? The attackers don’t have to put themselves into positions of official power. They just have to have “veto power” over the lives of those who wield it.

Our society and political system is perhaps far more fragile than we would like to believe. It’s resilience is extremely dependent upon being able to almost completely thwart those that would exercise “veto power” and get away with it.

Update: Mexico probably has a lot of data that could be used to answer the questions.