Via Bruce Schneier:

New Contest: Can You Out-Lame the TSA?

Last week, in response to my article about the idiocy of airport security, the head of the Transportation Security Administration, Kip Hawley, essentially conceded the main argument of my article, which was that America's aviation security system is not designed to catch smart terrorists, but stupid terrorists. Here's what Hawley wrote last week:

"Clever terrorists can use innovative ways to exploit vulnerabilities. But don't forget that most bombers are not, in fact, clever. Living bomb-makers are usually clever, but the person agreeing to carry it may not be super smart. Even if "all" we do is stop dumb terrorists, we are reducing risk."

Not quite believable. And yet he really said it.

And so, a contest: How would the Hawley Principle of Federally-Endorsed Mediocrity apply to other government endeavors?

...

So, go to it. E-mail your entries to Goldberg.Atlantic@gmail.com.  The Goldblog reader who comes up with the funniest application of the Hawley Principle wins a subscription to the Atlantic.

Here are my entries. They are probably too close to the truth to be funny but still I figure it's worthwhile to mock politicians in public anytime you get the chance:

1. Gun "buy-backs", restrictions on the type of guns, and carrying of guns don't slow down a violent criminal any. But getting guns out of the hands of small stature women, the elderly, and the infirm will at least prevent those people from being able to go out and commit violent crimes.
2. Hundreds of millions of meals are prepared each day in the U.S. by unlicensed food preparation people. These people prepare food for small children, the elderly, trusting family members, and unsuspecting friends. Food borne illness and accidental poisoning are exceedingly rare given the vast numbers of meals prepared without inspection by the health officials. Licensing and inspecting the professionals who prepare only a small portion of the total meals won't stop anyone but a minority of incompetent capitalists but at least it raising the cost of doing business will encourage more people to obtain their meals from those who are unlicensed and less tainted by capitalistic inclinations.

If Tamara enters I will concede--sight unseen.

Remember the post from last week? In the article I linked to they said:

It's not an image people would find invasive.

And:

It's not possible to save an image or get it out of the machine, it's physically not possible.

That was in Australia and this is the same technology being tested in Europe:

I wonder why the picture they share with us to demonstrate their technology is cut off the just below the breasts--NOT!

They are arguing about it now but I fully expect arguments that it is "for the children" or "the good of everyone" will prevail and within a year or so it will be back to normal Security Theater as usual with most everyone thinking they are safer when in fact they are not. But maybe it will save the little old ladies from getting their feet broken by TSA quite so often.

Update: Via a comment from Barron we now have more of the picture:

Nice, huh?

Jeffrey Goldberg tests TSA and finds it full of fail.

He does, and writes about it, all kinds of things that I knew were possible but didn't have the courage to do. Read it and laugh--or maybe cry.

TSA--A Security Theater.

George Orwell couldn’t have made this stuff up.

Jeff Soyer
October 20, 2008
Britain: More Police State on the Way
[On the state of affairs in Britain revealed by the article Passports will be needed to buy mobile phones.--Joe]

Heh. Mine will say "GET A WARRANT".

When examining the security of a system we have something called the "attack surface". This is the area exposed to threats. If the system being studied is a web site then among other things the attack surface is composed of the physical server, open ports, and the URL for the site. These "surfaces" can be attacked. For example the the URL could be attacked with alternate pages and query strings. If you get lucky and/or know what you are doing you can obtain access to configuration files (such as this one I just found) which frequently contain information that can be used to get unauthorized access. The larger the attack surface the harder it is to make the system secure.

In a free society the attack surface is enormous and we, consciously or unconsciously, have decided the benefits of an open free society out weigh the susceptibility to attack and/or the cost to defend the attack surfaces. For example the grocery store keeps all the fresh fruits and vegetables accessible for the customers to directly examine. This allows anyone to tamper with them for their own evil purposes. We don't have armed guards and security systems for the entire length of our water supply. We don't have the means to realistically protect our air supply from nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) attacks.

When an attack surface is so large that it is essentially indefensible the smart security experts will put their limited security resources into mitigate the risk. In the case of our water supply we have multiple systems and medical facilities which reduce the number of people affected from a single point attack and provide care for those that are affected.

These principles are well known and adhered to by security professionals. I must therefore conclude that TSA (A Security Theater) isn't concerned with real security. More evidence of this just came in:

The government has not been able to keep track of all the airport security uniforms and badges it issues, which makes secure areas in airports vulnerable to terrorists posing as authorized officials, according to an internal review released Friday.

The Homeland Security Department's inspector general looked at five airports across the country from October 2006 through June 2007. The IG found major deficiencies in the Transportation Security Administration's ability to keep track of uniforms, particularly after an employee leaves the job.

As some of us discussed at the Gun Blogger Rendezvous having a uniform and/or just being able to speak the language will get you access to places and things that should have been way out of bounds.

Another attack surface in airplane security is the process for screening materials that are allowed past the security check point:

If some copycat terrorists try to bring their liquid bomb through airport security and the screeners catch them -- like they caught me with my bottle of pasta sauce -- the terrorists can simply try again. They can try again and again. They can keep trying until they succeed. Because there are no consequences to trying and failing, the screeners have to be 100 percent effective. Even if they slip up one in a hundred times, the plot can succeed.

The same is true for knitting needles, pocketknives, scissors, corkscrews, cigarette lighters and whatever else the airport screeners are confiscating this week. If there's no consequence to getting caught with it, then confiscating it only hurts innocent people. At best, it mildly annoys the terrorists.

To fix this, airport security has to make a choice. If something is dangerous, treat it as dangerous and treat anyone who tries to bring it on as potentially dangerous. If it's not dangerous, then stop trying to keep it off airplanes. Trying to have it both ways just distracts the screeners from actually making us safer.

The attack surface the TSA is trying to protect is just too large. We should spend that money on alternatives. What we are doing now is just entertainment for those that enjoy security theater.

So what did you expect when the security theater people didn't improve security? Did you believe they would give up and spend the money on something effective? Of course not. Instead they make you the entertainment--Genitals, breasts not obscured in airport security trial.

This particular rights violation session wasn't as bad as some. As Barb said, "They were pretty good about guns here. Much better than Denver." I can't find where I wrote up my Denver experience but here is someone else's experience. I have to agree but it's still aggravating to be searched by government agents without a warrant or probable cause.

As I was researching this post I reviewed the TSA website again. I may have gotten lucky when TSA let me get through with three of my STI magazines in carry-on baggage. They saw them in the x-ray and pulled the bag off for further inspection while a police officer watched. They examined each of the magazines for ammunition, asked if I was law enforcement, and told me to have a nice trip.

The TSA says this about firearms parts:

You may only transport firearms, ammunition and firearm parts in your checked baggage. Firearms, ammunition and firearm parts are prohibited from carry-on baggage.

I guess it depends on what you define a firearm part to be.

An email from Molly H. over a month ago got lost in my in box and I just now found it while procrastinating about something else.

Remember those reinforced doors they put on the airplanes to help prevent hijackers from getting control of the plane? It turns out there aren't any restrictions on taking lock picks on board. And even if there were restrictions it is trivial to get them past security.

As Molly said, "More proof that TSA is just a security theater..." or as I like to point out the acronym TSA really should be AST for A Security Theater.

I think Kevin Baker has his problems with the TSA mostly fixed now. I'm pretty sure he is now able to avoid getting special treatment when he flies. But had the normal channels not worked he could have just changed his name. Apparently it works quite well.

My contempt for the TSA Security Theater is at an all time high. But there is a certain amount of truth to the claim that a great deal of security is about feeling secure rather than actually being secure. However this doesn't lower my contempt of the TSA, it just raises my contempt for sheeple and all government (redendency alert) idiots.

About 43,000 Transportation Security Administration officers are sporting new uniforms that make them look more like warriors in the battle against terrorism than baggage handlers.

 ...

The new look was rolled out today in Omaha and many other airports to mark the seventh anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

The uniform shirts change from white to blue. Instead of an embroidered badge, the officers will wear a metal badge. Their belts will be wider to better fit with the uniform pants.

The 65/35 polyester/cotton blend shirts will stay cleaner and be more comfortable, according to the agency.

A new arm patch will feature an eagle and a portion of the American flag. The patch is intended as a visible reminder of the organization's roots in the 2001 attacks.

Joseph Morton
September 11, 2008
Airport security crews go blue, and you're paying for it
[I find it very appropriate that on this day, of all days, the TSA demonstrates what it is really all about.--Joe]

Sometimes I can hardly believe the stupidity of the people that get elected to national office. This guy is a prime example:

"It is my belief that federal law prohibits individuals from carrying firearms in all areas of an airport and that TSA has the authority to enforce these restrictions," Thompson wrote. "To do otherwise would hamper TSA's ability to keep our airports secure."

...

TSA's inability to protect the general public from individuals carrying concealed weapons into an airport would pose a serious and unnecessary security threat," Thompson wrote. "If TSA management believes that no current law exists to clearly designate areas of an airport within the control and authority of federal transportation officials, the committee may seek legislative action to correct this omission."

What does his "belief" have to do with reality? He can just look up the law and read it--unless he is unable to read. There are "secure" areas and there is everywhere else. Regardless of the reality of whether these "secure" area are really secure or not how can a firearm ban for the entire airport be enforced unless they moved the metal detectors and x-ray machines outward to include the ticket counters and baggage claim areas?

Did this bigot get his thinking skills from a dumpster behind the Violence Policy Center? How does he think all the hunters, people attending shooting matches, and training get their firearms to a remote location? They are transported as per the TSA rules on firearms.

Tam says she is going to drive to summer camp so the TSA goons won't grope her and steal stuff from her luggage. Goons seems to be an accurate description of TSA behavior I see here. The text of the story is here. It was all over a bottle of contact lens solution.

I'll bet they wouldn't bat an eye over five pounds of flour or powdered sugar which would, if properly applied, bring down any commercial passenger plane in existence.

What TSA Really Stands For.

The TSA should just give it up and let congress spend that money on something that would do some good.

Also note that in this video the morons interviewed think that somehow outlawing the "glass knuckles" will make society safer. Do they think banning sharp sticks will make society safer? These things are so easy to make anyone with a room temperature I.Q. could be taught how to make them. But then maybe the media morons and the people they interviewed should be given a pass because they don't have a room temperature I.Q.

Instead of screaming bloody murder about the TSA (A Security Theater) Gail Todd chides the victim. The background is here:

When reader Marlys Powers prepared for a flight to visit her daughter in Phoenix, Ariz., she purchased a vinyl see-through bag to hold all her toiletries. She packed the bag with 3-ounce bottles of shampoo, lotions and toothpaste, as well as her toothbrush and hairbrush.

Marlys thought it would make it easier for security to see what was in her carry-on bag. Security didn't see it that way. Because it wasn't a quart-size bag, they took the lady aside and placed her in a private room for a thorough pat down.

After confirming she wasn't carrying any concealed weapons, they told her they would have to confiscate all her 3-ounce bottles because they weren't in an acceptable-size plastic bag. Then one agent discovered something else: two sandwich bags filled with cookies and banana bread Marlys was taking to her grandchildren.

The agent told her if she could combine her treats into one of the bags, she could use the other to stow her plastic bottles -- which she did. The agent placed that plastic bag back inside her original plastic container and told her to have a good flight -- which she didn't.

Marlys had already missed her flight. And because all carriers were overbooked, she spent several hours standing by for a flight with an empty seat.

While packing all your personal items in a single plastic bag might sound like a sensible thing to do, remember that common sense is not a prerequisite for security rules. And if it doesn't adhere strictly to the rules, it won't fly -- and neither will you.

She goes on to inform her readers how to avoid this by following the rules exactly. It doesn't matter they don't really make sense and are totally ineffective at preventing weapons from getting on planes. But Ms. Todd apparently lives in or near Chicago so it's not too surprising that she uncritically accepts government tyranny as just part of everyday life.

It's not exactly a trend but it's a start. I think the TSA should mandated it. It would make more sense from a security standpoint than what they do now. And it would only be slightly more offensive to some people. Others, including myself, would consider it less offensive.

Fly naked on nudist holiday flight.

I think the TSA has an impossible job. I think they are way out of bounds on the 4^th Amendment. I think they are blowing smoke just to try and keep their jobs. I think they should be abolished and that $5,000,000,000 per year should go toward something useful. But I don't hate them.

This guy hates them. And I guess I can see his point. Here is a sample:

Hate is a pretty strong word. But it's not strong enough to express how I feel about the TSA -- the Transportation Security Administration or Thousands Standing Around, depending on your point of view -- which runs those security checkpoints at American airports.

I may fear the IRS, and I may dread the DMV -- but for shear bureaucratic stupidity and its affront to personal liberties, the TSA has earned a special place of loathing in my heart.

[...]

My family and I - which means all three kids, including the baby - were returning home from vacation last week and dutifully filed in line for the ol' "Papers, please" routine at the Honolulu airport. I handed our five boarding passes and our ID to the lone TSA guy who gets paid to look at boarding documents and, according to TSA chief Hawley, use them to root out would-be terrorists every day. But this genius couldn't find any of our names on the boarding passes and handed them back to me, demanding that I show him where the names were. Heck, I didn't know. It's not my yob, man.

[...]

Apparently there was something in our "behavior" and/or our "documents" which triggered the crackerjack TSA security guards' suspicions. Yes, a middle-class white family with three young children, including a 16-month-old baby, returning from vacation set off alarm bells in some bureaucrat's mind. So we were instructed to move to the side for "enhanced" screening while all of our carry-on bags, including the baby's stroller, were hand-inspected.

Out of morbid curiosity, I asked if this was simply a "random check" that we'd been so lucky to be honored with. The terse reply from the agent on the front-lines of the war against terrorists was a simple, "No." So our selection couldn't even be explained away by the stupidity of random selection; these people intentionally singled us out as a potential security threat.

Barney Fife then proceeded to get a female agent to pat down my wife and two daughters before feeling me up-and-down himself. At which point my wife was instructed to hold the baby out with outstretched arms like Rafiki did with Simba on the rock ledge in "The Lion King" for a pat-down. Absolutely ridiculous.

In the meantime, another crackerjack TSA agent was busy rifling through our carry-on bags, and lo and behold, he caught my wife trying to smuggle onboard a tube of skin cream which exceeded the federally-mandated 3-ounce limit. Goober informed us he was confiscating the potentially lethal tube of Lubriderm, much to the relief of the other passengers standing in line who clearly were worried it might be used to send us all to a watery grave in Davy Jones' Locker somewhere over the Pacific.

With one of our bags now 5 ounces lighter, we finally were allowed to leave Checkpoint Charlie and proceed to the gate. Now for the kicker.

When we finally get home and unpack, I discover that the girls had inadvertently packed a pair of metal scissors they found at the condo where we stayed in their carry-on knapsack. Neither the TSA's expensive, super-sensitive X-ray machine nor hand-inspection of the bag detected this pair a metal scissors - but they did find the Lubriderm! Don't you feel safer now?

And here is a video of someone actually sneaking a simulated bomb through security. Anyone that doesn't believe we need to explore different means for airplane security is either willfully ignorant or has some agenda they aren't sharing.

As I reported yesterday The American Jewish Committee says the government need to take our guns from us so it can protect us.

Here is an example of the government protecting us from a five year old child. I especially like the part about the mother not being allowed to hug him while he is being detained.

TSA -- A Security Theater.

The truth is, regardless of how many pointy tools and shampoo bottles we confiscate, there shall remain an unlimited number of ways to smuggle dangerous items onto a plane. The precise shape, form and substance of those items is irrelevant. We are not fighting materials, we are fighting the imagination and cleverness of the would-be saboteur.

Thus, what most people fail to grasp is that the nuts and bolts of keeping terrorists away from planes is not really the job of airport security at all. Rather, it’s the job of government agencies and law enforcement. It’s not very glamorous, but the grunt work of hunting down terrorists takes place far off stage, relying on the diligent work of cops, spies and intelligence officers. Air crimes need to be stopped at the planning stages. By the time a terrorist gets to the airport, chances are it’s too late.

Patrick Smith
December 28, 2007
The Airport Security Follies
[As near as I can tell the only people that argue for the continued existence or claim effectiveness of the TSA are the people of the TSA. It's not that the people of the TSA are necessarily stupid or incompetent, its that it is an unsolvable problem. It's time we considered alternatives.--Joe]

I've been saying this for years, pointed out the TSA is engaged in illegal acts, they know they are illegal, they are stupid, even idiotic, security is a joke, and then I suggested some tests of better security concepts. Now the Harvard School of Public Health says:

Study: Airport Screening Process Pointless

Airport security lines can annoy passengers, but there is no evidence that they make flying any safer, U.S. researchers reported Thursday.

[...]

"Even without clear evidence of the accuracy of testing, the Transportation Security Administration defended its measures by reporting that more than 13 million prohibited items were intercepted in one year," the researchers added. "Most of these illegal items were lighters."

This is like the Brady Bunch crowing at how effective NICS is because millions of people have been denied the sale of a firearm. Never mind that some of those people were guilty of "crimes" like being in possession of a deck of cards having naked white women on them (the "criminal" was black) and that the Brady act has never been shown to have made the public safer (Just One Question).

"We'd like airport security screening to be of value. As passengers and members of the public we'd like to know the evidence and the reasoning behind these measures," Linos said in a telephone interview.

With $5.6 billion spent globally on airport protection each year, the public should be encouraged to query some screening requirements -- such as forcing passengers to remove their shoes, the researchers said.

"Can you hide anything in your shoes that you cannot hide in your underwear?" they asked.

A TSA spokesman was not immediately available to comment.

The British Medical Journal contributed:

There is no solid evidence that the huge amounts of money spent on airport security screening measures since September 11th are effective, argue researchers in the Christmas issue of the BMJ.

[...]

Despite worldwide airport protection costing an estimated $5.6 billion every year, they found no comprehensive studies evaluating the effectiveness of passenger or hand luggage x-ray screening, metal detectors or explosive detection devices. There was also no clear evidence of testing accuracy.

The US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) defends its measures by reporting that more than 13 million prohibited items were intercepted in one year. But, argue the authors, there is no way of knowing what proportion of these items would have led to serious harm.

This raises several questions, they say, such as what is the sensitivity of the screening question: 'Did you pack all your bags yourself?' and has anyone ever said 'no'? What are the ethical implications of pre-selecting high risk groups? Are new technologies that 'see' through clothes acceptable and what hazards should we screen for?

While there may be other benefits to rigorous airport screening, the absence of publicly available evidence to satisfy even the most basic criteria of a good screening programme concerns us, they write.

Put this another way. If you were selling a product advertised as curing some disease and it, in fact, did no better in scientific tests than a placebo you would be at least fined and probably go to jail. If you sold a product advertised to allow your car to use water as fuel you could be sued when it didn't work. But the U.S. Government can get away with providing nothing more than comfort to those that want to feel more secure while actually decreasing the security of travelers at great expense.

Can you imagine a snake-oil salesman using the defense, "My customers wanted to feel they were doing something even if their disease was incurable. Therefore I did nothing wrong." Prosecutors would break out the victory champagne before the defense drew their next breath. And so it should be with the TSA. Either they are incredibly stupid or they are snake-oil salesmen who should go to jail.

I sometimes wish I could output snark like this:

The report follows recent news that screeners at Los Angeles International Airport missed 75% of the fake bombs that investigators tried to smuggle onto planes during tests two years ago. The excuse from TSA officials: The tests were difficult and designed to trip up screeners. Whereas Al Qaeda will doubtless hide its bombs in brightly marked packages.

But then I would probably want to use it for occasions that would jeopardize my job and marriage.

Nice. The TSA is a joke. Kip Hawley is the head of the TSA. He says airport security is good. Investigators do what I have been saying could be done. Hawley tries to put a spin on it in front of congress and gets slapped down:

Investigators used public information to make a liquid bomb consisting of a detonator and a liquid explosive. They made a firebomb using two common products.

To absolute silence in the hearing room, the investigators screened video footage showing tests of their homemade bombs. One clip showed the device exploding inside a car -- metal flying, glass shattering, car doors buckling open and a voice, off camera, saying, "Oh!"

The investigators then designed ways to sneak the components past screeners.

The airports tested were kept classified.

The GAO recommended improvements in personnel, processes and technology; more aggressive pat-downs; and possible restrictions on carry-on luggage.

"Current policies allowing substantial carry-on luggage and related items through TSA checkpoints" increase the risk of a terrorist bringing an improvised explosive device or improvised incendiary device onto a plane, the report said.

Hawley downplayed the tests, arguing first that the components did not get on the plane. "It did get on the plane," countered Gregory Kutz of the GAO.

Hawley then contended that the components the GAO smuggled were not the ones used in the video footage. The GAO's Cooney corrected him.

Hawley also noted that GAO investigators did not smuggle a complete bomb past the checkpoint. Cooney, seated beside him, said: "We could simply have gone into the lavatory and constructed it there."

They don't arrive at the proper conclusion but they are getting the proper data--which is a start.

It's a pleasant fantasy but the people offering these sort of solutions either don't understand the problem or don't want to face reality. From one of our wonderful government laboratories:

Los Alamos Lab developing liquid scanner for airport security

Scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing a new type of scanner that can distinguish liquids blaring out a warning for bad ones, like explosives, while letting through good ones, like water.

...

They will be able to scan bottles as big as a "magnum-sized champaign bottle," Espy said.

"Apparently the whole duty-free thing is suffering, and people can't carry their liquor on airplanes anymore," Espy said. "It's been disruptive to commerce. So, that's one of the benefits of this."

Software upgrades could add new liquids to the device's detection list if any new threats arise, she said.

"The nice thing about this system is it's not tuned to any specific threats," Espy said. "As new materials of concern arise, it can be adapted to detect those."

Even after the scanner is in place we still won't be able to take liquor on airplanes--unless they are going to allow ethanol on board. In which case I need to demonstrate how to make an "explosive" out of ethanol. It would be tough to get a true detonation but in the enclosed space of an airplane cabin it just won't matter whether the speed of propagation is greater than or less than the speed of sound.

And if they stop letting people take liquid hydrocarbons on board I'll demonstrate the same sort of thing is possible with bread flour, powdered sugar, or coffee creamer. And when they ban those let them build a scanner that is sensitive to powdered human hair.

And those ideas are all taking the direct "brute force" approach. There are lots of other, much more subtle, ways to defeat airport "security". TSA is backward for A Security Theater. It's time we considered the alternatives.

If some terrorist gets a bomb through security TSA (A Security Theater) is apparently going to tell them try again because they missed it the first time or three. But since it's coming from that liberal haven (read "logic impaired") of San Francisco it all sort of makes sense:

USA Today revealed that a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) report found screeners at SFO failed to find small bomb parts 20 percent of the time during a recent 12-month test.

SFO spokesperson, Mike McCarron, said the failure rate is unacceptable.

But McCarron said the TSA may have simply made the test too hard.

See also these news items on airport security:

• Report: U.S. screeners not catching bombs
• Airport security 'not where we need to be'
• US baggage control still lacking: report
• TSA: Turbans Don't Have to Be Removed

This last item is of particular interest because the TSA is telling everyone, "Hide your stuff here, we won't look there."

I've been harping on this for a long time and I don't see any evidence to invalidate my conclusions. It's time to consider alternatives to TSA because what we have now is just Security Theater.

I suppose its to be expected. You can't get more government contracts if you were to tell them the problem cannot be solved as long as they are headed in that direction. But what you can do is sell them millions and millions of dollars of technology that can be defeated with a few dollars worth of mu-metal and/or a Faraday Shield. I guess it doesn't matter. It's just government money. They have to spend it on something anyway, right?

Here are the details:

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has a comforting prospect for the million or so daily passengers on U.S. airlines. Los Alamos National Laboratory is working on an alternative to the "sandwich bag" solution for carry-on liquids.

Passengers' ability to carry liquids with them during boarding has improved since the original total ban installed after a plot involving liquid explosives on transatlantic flights was busted in London in August 2006.

A total ban has given way to a partial ban because current X-ray machines can detect liquids, but they don't know the difference between Gatorade and a liquid explosive.

But the so-called "3-1-1" plan for placing smaller-than-3-ounce liquid containers into one separately scanned, quart-size plastic bag per passenger remains an annoyance for many airport travelers, a fact that has not been lost on the department.

Within a month after the London scheme was foiled, said Michelle Espy, LANL's co-principal investigator on the project, the laboratory had sketched out a "proof of concept" for a liquid-sensing instrument that has come to be called SENSIT.

In May this year, Brian Tait, a program manager in the Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency made a presentation on LANL's demonstration for using magnetic resonance technology to perform non-invasive "liquid and solid explosive detection at ultra-low field without radiation."

Espy said the technology is a variation on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), a very low-field approach that the lab has been using for studying the brain in a technique known as magneto-encephalography, which is a way of reading signals emanating from the brain.

The sensor or magnetometer used in both the brain study and the bottle analyzer is known as a SQUID, an acronym that stands for Superconducting Quantum Interfering Device.

Comforting? I suppose you could say that. It will give some people a false sense of comfort. But then that's what TSA is all about anyway. A Security Theater that makes some people feel good.

Box Cutter Sails Through Airport Security

At least TSA put on a little bit of a show for their Security Theater. They make him pour out his coffee.

TSA head Kip Hawley (http://www.kiphawleyisanidiot.com/) attempts to explain the reason for the three ounce limit on liquids and why the rule is reasonable. He is deliberately obscure in places:

“This is something we thought a lot about. There’s a whole classified section to the answer, but in the unclassified part we are limited to discussing, with 3-1-1, the major focus was first, to stop assembled bombs,” he said.

“The nature of liquid explosives is that they are very volatile, unlike military-grade explosives that react predictably. With homemade explosives, while the benefit is that they are made of easy-to-get ingredients, the downside is that you get widely different results for the same quote-unquote recipe.

“If you’re going to use these explosives in the aviation context, you have to be very precise in the mixing because, as we found in the testing, minor variations in formula have a very dramatic effect on whether or not the explosives are successful.

“So 3-1-1- eliminates the ability to assemble the ingredients in a laboratory, using expert people to provide a finished bomb for somebody to use on a suicide mission on an airplane,” he said.

On a plane, mixing up a bomb in a suitable container “isn’t like mixing a beverage,” he said, adding: “This stuff is very volatile; it is very obvious; you can smell it a long way away. It’s very corrosive.”

The volatile stuff he's talking about would be the acetone used to make acetone peroxide. And yes acetone is very smelly. I have never made acetone peroxide and have no plans to. It's called "Mother of Satan" for a reason.

The "very corrosive" stuff would be nitric and sulfuric acids used to make nitroglycerin; probably the most well known of all liquid explosives.

Yup. Mixing up either of those explosives without being noticed would be difficult on a plane. The acetone in particular is very noticeable. Finger polish remover is frequently acetone. So if someone starts working on removing their fingernail polish don't be surprised if you see the flight crew getting a little excited about finding the source of the smell.

The problem with the whole explosives testing thing is that there are lots of things made out of stuff they don't, and essentially can't, test for that make the whole exercise just A Security Theater. That money would be far better spent on finding the bad guys before they ever got to the airport. But don't expect Hawley to tell you that. It's not his job to tell you his job is a sham. His job is to make you feel safer. Do you feel safe yet?

First a refresher course.

I don't know if he actually believes this or not. Maybe he does and just doesn't have a good imagination. Or maybe it's just that it's part of his job to comfort the sheepeople even if he knows he isn't telling them the complete truth:

Chief Troyer has been a driving force behind all of the airport security changes that has especially been focusing on removing items from people's luggage that could be used to make explosives.

But we get this doublespeak and I just get annoyed with him:

“I don't necessarily see it as being stricter as it is begin responsive to the threat,” Spokane International Airport Police Chief Pete Troyer said.

Whatever. The guy is just an actor in a security theater. What can you expect from someone like that? He reads his lines and he entertains the public.

You can make a crude stun gun from a disposable camera. A better quality flash unit will have a faster recycle time.

There is no limit the number and type of weapons that can be easily made and gotten past the Theater Security Agents (TSA). I've already mentioned making dust explosions with flour (powdered coffee creamer works too). It's long past time to consider some alternatives to existing airplane security.

Interesting. My most recent post about the TSA is getting more and more attention. Most recent is this mention in a forum:

If you really need to believe that you're safe when you get on a plane, don't read the above. If you want to realize what a bullshit fantasy "safety" through a "security" agency is, then take the red pill and click the link.

I like how he expressed that. Very nice. I remember one time not too long after 9/11 Ry was having Thanksgiving dinner with us and our extended family at my parent's place. Somehow Ry (software tester extraordinaire--finding flaws is what software testers do) and I started talking about all the vulnerabilities in our country that someone could use to cause us great damage. We were rattling things off so fast that someone had to raise their voice to get in a command to "STOP". People didn't want to know. They wanted ignorance. This is baffling to me, but whatever.

Anyway, on to what makes particular posts interesting...

Uncle and Existing Thing (via Uncle) linked to my TSA post. I was thinking Uncle would link to it when I made it. He links to almost anything of mine that is a little out of the ordinary (honest, I have only made him one offer for a free position at Boomershoot--which he hasn't acted upon. I don't think that constitutes bribery). Thinking about what makes a post interesting I made the connection to the recent career advice from Scott Adams (via Kim). I have expertise in more than one field and combining that expertise with a somewhat rare political viewpoint (pro-freedom) increases my "value". In this case it was my expertise in explosives and (computer) security.

I keep wondering if there is a way to combine all my hobbies in an interesting way. But at least for me guns, explosives, and sex just don't mix.

It is late at night and I got a little agitated reading some of the comments at Schneier's blog post about airplane security. When I'm tired my inhibtions drop and I write things I might not normally. Here's a duplicate of the rant I left in Schneier's comments:

Regarding dust explosions...

This is about 8 ounces of flour over an ounce of black powder (the original gun powder): http://www.joehuffman.org/FlashTek/06-FFFFgFlour.mpeg

That is in open air. In an enclosed room of an abandoned house a similar test brought the house down. Sorry, that wasn't my test and I don't have any video for it.

Shaped charges made from match heads? I don't think so. The "detonation" velocity is just too slow. It's more properly called deflagration than detonation for that type of "explosive". Shaped charges require MUCH faster propagation rates.

Binary explosives are available here: http://www.tannerite.com/ No background check, no license required, delivered to your door via UPS. Now THAT is something you can make a crude shaped charge with.

The "projectile" (typically a slug of molten copper) from a shaped charge is moving at 6 to 10 kilometers per second. At the pressures generated when it hits a "target" everything is "plastic". Hardened steel develops a hole just like a high velocity stream from your garden hose nozzle punches a hole in a dirt bank. Penetration for a properly configured 10 (ten) gram shaped charges is about 2 inches of steel. Yes--a shaped charge using less than one half ounce of explosives will penetrate two inches of steel. See Explosives Engineering by Paul W. Cooper, ISBN 0-471-18636-8 page 442. Or do you think the doors to the cockpit are more resistant than two inches of steel?

Do you think someone could not get a half ounce of explosives through TSA security? You could probably successfully hide that in your mouth or arm pit if you didn't want to use some other body cavity.

Oh, and you know why the explosives detectors work fairly well with plastic explosives? It's, by international agreement (Montreal, March 1, 1991, Article XIII of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives -- http://www.atf.gov/explarson/fedexplolaw/subpartj.pdf ), that all plastic explosives be "marked" by their manufacture with a chemical that is easily detected. Do you think Iran and others are going to abide by that International Convention if they want to provide some terrorists plastic explosives?

We really should spend the $2 billion/year, or whatever it is, on finding and stopping the bad guys before they arrive at the airport/train-station/shopping-mall/etc. than on pointless screening. The bottom line is that the acronym TSA should be reversed--it really stands for "A Security Theater".

Screening ideas are indeed thought up by the Office for Annoying Air Travelers and vetted through the Directorate for Confusion and Complexity, and then we review them to insure that there are sufficient unintended irritating consequences so that the blogosphere is constantly fueled.

Kip Hawley
Head of the Transp